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Abstract—Quality randomness is fundamental to crypto-
graphic operations but on embedded systems good sources are
(seemingly) hard to find. Rather than use expensive custom hard-
ware, our ERHARD-RNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
(PRNG) utilizes entropy sources that are already common in a
range of low-cost embedded platforms. We empirically evaluate
the entropy provided by three sources—SRAM startup state,
oscillator jitter, and device temperature—and integrate those
sources into a full Pseudo-Random Number Generator imple-
mentation based on Fortuna [1]. Our system addresses a number
of fundamental challenges affecting random number generation
on embedded systems. For instance, we propose SRAM startup
state as a means to efficiently generate the initial seed—even for
systems that do not have writeable storage. Further, the system’s
use of oscillator jitter allows for the continuous collection of
entropy-generating events—even for systems that do not have
the user-generated events that are commonly used in general-
purpose systems for entropy, e.g., key presses or network events.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern security technologies depend on strong random
numbers for creating encryption keys, signatures, and nonces
for sensitive data. The strength of these numbers is dependent
on a reliable source of entropy and a secure Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (PRNG). On general purpose systems such
as Linux, the entropy is usually gathered from the timing of
unpredictable events, e.g., user key strokes, mouse movements,
and disk events. Further, initial seeding of the generator is
usually done by reading in a seed file or by delaying random
number generation until enough entropy can be collected.
However, entropy sources used by general purpose systems
are poorly suited to the embedded environment. For example,
key stroke information cannot be collected by a system that
does not have a keyboard attached. Similarly, seed files cannot
be used when the system does not have a disk.
This work examines the feasibility of implementing a PRNG
fed by high-quality entropy sources in an embedded environ-
ment with limited hardware and software resources. Previous
studies proposed using specialized hardware in either an FPGA
or an ASIC to gather entropy [2], [3]; However, such hardware
can add significant production cost to embedded systems.
In contrast, the system we present, ERHARD-RNG, utilizes
existing internal hardware that is commonly found in a wide
variety of inexpensive microcontrollers. In particular, our im-
plementation of ERHARD-RNG targets the Texas Instruments
MSP430 (MSP430F5529) low-power microcontroller using
only an external 4MHz crystal oscillator and power supply.
We chose this platform due to its numerous programmable pe-
ripherals, its commonality in embedded systems development,
and its affordability. Many microcontrollers and Systems On a
Chip (SoC) include similar hardware that allows our PRNG to
be implemented, including chips from Atmel, Xilinx, Cypress
Semiconductor, and other chips from Texas Instruments.
ERHARD-RNG is based on three key insights. First, we
can address the challenge of collecting entropy at runtime by
sampling the jitter of the low-power/low-precision oscillator.
Coupled with measurements of the internal temperature sensor
we can effectively re-seed our PRNG with minimal overhead.
Second, we can solve the problem of initial seeding by lever-
aging randomness inherent in the startup state of RAM [4]. Fi-
nally, we also propose the use of a Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC) as a mixing and collapsing function for transforming
the RAM startup state into the initial seed, overcoming the
processing limitations created by a small memory space.
Our system, based on the Fortuna PRNG [1], was designed
and implemented on the MSP430. We empirically evaluate the
amount of entropy generated by each of our sources and the
overall quality of the random numbers generated by the PRNG.
Additionally, we analyze the effect of different operating
environments on the entropy sources; As systems operate at
different supply voltages and environment temperatures, it is
important to understand the extent to which the performance
of the PRNG is dependent on particular physical parameters,
e.g., external temperature.
II. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ERHARD-RNG
PRNGs rely on a source of true randomness, entropy, that
often provides an initial seed from which a random stream
of data is produced. Depending on the generator design,
entropy sources may also be used to periodically re-seed the
PRNG, extending the number of outputs that can be produced
before the generator is liable to repeat sequences or become
predictable. One such generator that frequently uses entropy
sources to re-seed is Fortuna, a block cipher-based PRNG
designed by Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier [1]. Fortunta
forms the foundation of ERHARD-RNG.
ERHARD-RNG, like Fortuna, is divided into two com-
ponents: the generator and the accumulator. The generator
consists of a block cipher that encrypts a counter value to
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produce a block of random bytes. After every data request the
encryption key is replaced with a new output from the block
cipher in order to reduce security vulnerabilities in the event
an of attacker learning of the internal state [1].
Beyond basic implementation details, ERHARD-RNG in-
cludes a number of design changes from the original specifi-
cation of Fortuna: seed file management, entropy pool inputs,
and entropy pool size.
Seed File Management. The originally specified manner for
managing the seed file is to rewrite the contents of the seed
with an output from the generator after every startup [1]. On an
embedded device this is difficult due to the lack of an initial
seed on the first boot of a device and limited non-volatile
memory. By using SRAM startup state (see Section III-C), we
removed the need for managing a seed file. Instead, ERHARD-
RNG reads the mixed SRAM state from the low 64 bytes
of memory, which is produced during a CRC startup routine
before the main program begins.
This seed management scheme also improves the boot speed
of the application when compared to the alternative of writing
and reading a seed file from FLASH. FLASH operations take a
considerable amount of time and would slow down the device
start up during seed file management. Using the CRC mixing
function is fast, as each calculation happens in hardware within
2 clock cycles while the CPU prepares the next byte of SRAM
for computation.
Entropy Pool Contribution. The accumulator consists of a
set of 32 entropy pools which are fed random data from any
number of entropy sources. In Fortuna, the data contributed
to each pool consists of the random data itself and a source
identifier which indicates the origins of the sample. However,
as memory is not readily available in embedded devices,
ERHARD-RNG does not include the source IDs when adding
the source sample to an entropy pool.
Entropy Pool Size. When a pool is filled with enough entropy
to replenish the generator, the pool contents are collapsed
into a 256-bit value that becomes the new generator key. The
collapsing is done using a cryptographic hashing algorithm.
For ERHARD-RNG, 58 events are required to reseed the
generator with 128 bits of entropy; this number was used as the
minimum entropy pool size for re-seeding in order to ensure
consistent protection of the generator state. ERHARD-RNG’s
entropy sources can re-seed the generator every 3ms.
A. Algorithm Selection
Fortuna’s design does not specify a particular block cipher
or hashing algorithm, however there are limitations on which
algorithms can be used due to key, block, and digest sizes. The
block cipher is required to have a 128-bit block to fit a 128-
bit counter value, and a 256-bit key. The hashing algorithm
digest must also be 256-bit in order to produce new keys
during re-seeding. Further limitations placed our ERHARD-
RNG variation were code size and execution time due to
limited memory and a slow clock speed.
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Fig. 1: ERHARD-RNG Architecture.
We selected AES-256 and SHA-2 256 as the block cipher
and hashing algorithm, respectfully, due to their input and
output sizes, and the availability of software libraries for
embedded systems.
B. Implementation
The full ERHARD-RNG architecture, as implemented on
the MSP430 and illustrated in Figure 1, utilizes two runtime
entropy sources (the VLO and temperature sensor) and one
entropy source for the seed file (SRAM startup state). The
generator operates independently from the accumulator and
periodically hashes the entropy pools into the generator block
cipher core. The entropy sources are discussed in more detail
in Section III.
Taking into account the entropy estimates of both the VLO
and the temperature sensor, approximately 4.4 bits of entropy
are collected between the two runtime sources at an average
rate of 9.5 kHz. In the event that the internal state of the
generator is compromised, the accumulator would take 58
entropy source events, or 3ms, to gather 128 bits of entropy
and reseed the generator.
We used the NIST Statistical Test Suite [5] to test the
randomness of ERHARD-RNG and summarize the results in
Table I. Columns C1 to C10 represent the frequency at
which passing p-values are calculated for blocks (p-values
gauge whether a block is likely to pass a specific randomness
threshold). The p-value calculated from a chi-square test is in
the following column, with the pass-rate of the test following
in the next column. All of the pass rates are above the required
threshold for confirming good random data.
III. ENTROPY SOURCES
ERHARD-RNG leverages three components of the MSP430
as entropy sources for seeding the generator and feeding the
accumulator. Two of the sources, phase jitter in an internal
low-power oscillator and a temperature sensor were used as
feeders to the entropy pool. The third source, the startup state
of SRAM, was used as an initial seed for the generator. The
following sections discuss each of these sources and analyze
their behavior and entropic qualities.
TABLE I: Randomness tests on ERHARD-RNG samples
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 P-Value Pass Ratio
Frequency 288 285 262 265 296 268 239 327 266 304 0.015832 2771/2800
BlockFrequency 276 287 264 312 261 289 275 277 285 274 0.666097 2774/2800
CUmulativeSums 292 242 293 301 274 255 267 253 320 303 0.012556 2769/2800
Runs 260 285 323 273 276 267 261 287 269 299 0.205375 2774/2800
LongestRun 275 313 286 296 281 274 248 266 269 292 0.314759 2773/2800
A. Low-Powered Oscillator
The MSP430 has an internal Very Low-Power Oscillator
(VLO) that is intended to be used in low-power applications
where an external oscillator is not able to be powered or is
not present. As it is powered internally and is not sourced
from a high-precision crystal, the VLO is subject to phase
jitter. Phase jitter is the small time difference between when a
controlled oscillator has a rising edge, and when it is expected
to have a rising edge in an ideal model [6]. This signal artifact
has been used in other RNGs before [2], [3], [7].
One other characteristic of interest is oscillator wander,
the tendency for the frequency to stray far away from the
typical frequency. Unlike phase jitter, this phenomenon is not
desirable in an entropy source, as oscillator wander can be
influenced by changes in the operating environment [6]. Using
an oscilloscope capture in infinite-persist mode we observed
that the period sits at a consistent typical frequency with slight
fluctuations in the form of phase jitter, i.e., the VLO instability
manifests as jitter and not oscillator wander.
Entropy Estimate. We used the NIST SP 800-90B entropy
estimation suite to measure a min-entropy of 1.47 bits per 8-
bit sample at a voltage of 2.4V using one million samples. We
also tested samples from the VLO across a voltage range of
2.4V to 3.6V—the maximum supply range for the MSP430
running at 24MHz [8]—and a temperature range of 75 ◦F to
0 ◦F. The lowest min-entropy we observed was 1.19 bits per
sample at 2.9V at 75 ◦F.
At a fixed temperature and voltage, the VLO min-entropy
estimates remained consistent, regardless of the temperature
itself. However, when samples were collected while the en-
vironment temperature was actively changing, the entropy
estimates decreased. This is likely because of the VLO periods
increasing or decreasing in a constant direction, introducing a
more predictable pattern to the period samples.
B. Temperature Sensor
The second runtime entropy source used by ERHARD-RNG
is an internal temperature sensor that measures an aggregate
of the environment and internal temperatures of the microcon-
troller. The sensor was routed as an input to a 12-bit Analog
to Digital Converter (ADC) with a reference voltage of 1.5V
to increase the resolution of the sensor to 0.366mV/bit for
maximum sensitivity. In order to allow each entropy source to
contribute to the pools evenly, we configured the ADC to make
conversions of the temperature sensor at 9.5 kHz to match the
typical period of the VLO at a supply of 3.3V.
Entropy Estimate. The min-entropy estimate for the temper-
ature sensor at 9.5 ksps was 2.93 bits per 8-bit sample.
C. SRAM Startup State
In addition to the runtime entropy sources, ERHARD-RNG
also requires a 64-byte seed file that initializes the generator
key at start up; this is a challenge in embedded devices due
to limited non-volatile memory. However, previous work has
shown that the startup state of SRAM cells exhibits a random
pattern and can be used as a large pool of boot-time entropy
in embedded systems [4]. Our ERHARD-RNG implementation
utilized the start up state of SRAM on the MSP430 (10KB) o
create a 64-byte seed file. Here we define startup state as the
initial memory state after power-on before any function calls
or data were placed on the software stack.
Entropy Estimate. We measured the startup state across
100 startups with 30 second power-off periods between each
startup to create a set of one million samples. Although SRAM
was estimated to have 0.457844 bits of entropy per byte, we
observed that bytes change at different rates; The majority of
the bytes changed from 3 to 10 times, while others changed
up to 30 times. This observation suggest that the randomness
is likely spread out over the entire memory and it is important
to use the entire memory to calculate the seed—i.e., 10KB
needs to be collapsed down to a 64 byte memory segment
without disturbing the RAM state. To do this, ERHARD-RNG
uses a built-in CRC module to mix each block of 160 bytes
down to a 16-bit value with high entropy. The viability of this
CRC-CCITT-16 hardware mixing function is discussed in the
following section.
D. Comparison of Entropy Sources
As a performance and security benchmark, we compared the
entropy sources in ERHARD-RNG to those used by a general
purpose Linux system. The Linux generator uses three sources
of entropy: User input events (keyboard and mouse), hardware
interrupts, and disk access events [9]. Each event is paired with
a timestamp, the precision of which is dependent on the system
configuration; for our experiments we observed timestamps
with 4ms precision. In addition to the entropy sources, the
generator’s entropy pool is saved and restored across system
power cycles to provide starting entropy.
Using a modification to the Linux kernel, we collected
one million samples from each source to test with the NIST
estimation suite. Shown in Table II, the maximum amount of
entropy from a single source was 0.742 bits per sample from
TABLE II: Linux source entropy estimates
Min-Entropy MCV Est. Collision Est. Markov Est. Compression Est.
User Input ID 0.7419 2.0395 1.3447 1.8323 0.7419
User Input Time 0.1147 7.8872 0.1147 1.0752 0.9996
Interrupt ID 0.3817 0.9961 0.7572 0.9243 0.3817
Interrupt Time 0.6000 5.3211 0.6692 0.6000 0.8555
Disk Access ID 0.0075 0.9964 0.8398 0.0075 0.3845
Disk Access Time 0.3159 5.2679 0.3159 0.4325 0.5134
user input events. The time needed to collect the high-entropy
input events spanned three days, whereas interrupts required
1 hour, and disk events required over a day for disk access
events to be initiated by the user.
The ERHARD-RNG sources have significantly higher esti-
mates than the Linux entropy sources, particularly the VLO
and temperature sensor. Additionally, both the user input and
disk event sources are dependent on user input, which could
starve the system if the computer is not used frequently
enough. In contrast, the sources used in this work are not
dependent on an external user. Furthermore, the ERHARD-
RNG sources run much faster than the Linux sources, and
can generate a high volume of samples in a very short period
of time (on the order of seconds).
1) CRC as a Mixing Function: CRCs are a type of algebraic
cyclic code that operates on the underlying principles of
polynomial division over the field GF(2), modulo a generator
polynomial G(x). The individual bits of the CRC inputs are
treated as the binary coefficients of polynomials, and the
remainder, often called the syndrome, of division by G(x) is
used as the CRC output [10]. This structure of a cyclic code
is important in the analysis of CRCs for entropy mixing.
One class of entropy mixing functions is resilient functions.
A [n, m, d] resilient function maps from a domain of Zn2 ,
to Zm2 (n-bit and m-bit binary strings), where the knowledge
or control over d bits of the input reveal no information
about the output. Such functions can be formed from linear
error-correcting codes with Hamming Distance d + 1. The
mapping from domain to codomain is performed by multi-
plying an input by a generator matrix, G, for the linear code
[F (x) = xGT ]. This operation is analagous to calculation of
a syndrome within a cyclic code [7], and makes the CRC-
CCITT-16 an attractive candidate for a resilient function.
Since CRCs are error-correcting codes, they are designed to
produce different syndromes for different input sequences to
allow for error detection. As a 16 bit CRC, this variation of the
code is able to detect any bit errors (ie. changing bits), within a
16-bit input [10]. Thus, there is a unique output for any inputs
up to 16 bits, so individual oscillator period sample inputs will
have unique effects on the final CRC result. Furthermore, as
CRC-CCITT-16 is implemented as a Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR), the nature of the output is randomized, as is
the purpose of a LFSR-based RNG [11].
Beyond the results of individual inputs, longer input streams
must also produce different results even with few varying input
bits. A generator with a primitive polynomial factor of degree
n for a CRC guarantees detection of 2-bit differences in input
streams that are at most 2n− 1 bits apart [10]. Thus it can be
guaranteed that different CRC-CCITT-16 outputs will result
for input streams that differ in 2 bits that are 32767 places
away from each other, far larger than the maximum of 1280
bits that pass through the CRC for extraction. Additionally,
since the generator polynomial G(x) = x16 + x12 + x5 +1 is
the product of (x + 1) and a primitive polynomial, the CRC
can detect all parity errors, which are errors consisting of an
odd-number of bit differences [10].
Based on previous work in CRC analysis, the CCITT-16
generator with an input of 256 bits has a Hamming Distance
of 4 bits; precisely 6587 inputs with 4-bit-wide differences
will be un-noticed [12]. Taking into account that a large
amount of the input bits from SRAM are deterministic and
that the majority of bytes only differ by a few values, a very
small fraction of all the possible input sequences may not
be detected. Additionally, there are no 5-bit errors that are
undetectable [12]. Any 6-bit errors are highly unlikely to occur
due to limited number of values each SRAM byte may contain.
The relevant properties of CRC-CCITT-16 as a mixing
function are summarized as follows. (i) A primitive-based gen-
erator allows detection of all odd-numbered bit differences. (ii)
Generator polynomial degree 15 guarantees detection of all 2-
bit differences within the 256-bit input. (iii) A maximal-length
LFSR design ensures pseudo-randomness in outputs. (iv) A
small amount of 4-bit-wide input differences are undetectable,
although wide bit differences are not critical to detect in this
application. (v) All 5-bit-wide input differences are detectable.
(vi) We don’t expect any 6-bit-wide input differences.
IV. CONCLUSION
We presented the design of a PRNG for commonly avail-
able embedded systems, ERHARD-RNG, that uses existing
hardware peripherals as entropy sources. A previously design
PRNG variant, Fortuna, was used along with three entropy
sources: jitter in a low-power oscillator, measurements from
an internal temperature sensor, and the start up state of SRAM.
We provided entropy estimates for each source, and discussed
how to build a system that efficiently uses memory and pro-
cessing time resources to manage the collection and processing
of sources. Furthermore, we proposed the use of a CRC
hardware module to offload processing of the SRAM startup
state to obtain an initial seed for the PRNG. Using ERHARD-
RNG as a reference, similar PRNGs can be implemented
on other platforms to achieve reliable randomness, enabling
security-critical functions in resource-restricted systems.
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